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for patients with families. An adve 
cate for one person is morally d e  
barred fiom making decisions when 
more than one have legitimate inter- 
ests at stake. 
We must, then, move beyond the 
ethics of the dyad or even the con- 
temporary triad. Instead, we must 
learn to think in terms of family jus- 
tice. Fairness to all concerned will be 
a major factor in determining both 
who should decide and also what is 
the appropriate treatment at the end 
of life. That’s the way decisions by 
and for people with families ought 
to be made-with everyone thinking 
about what will be best and fairest 
for all. 
This idea might seem hopeless b e  
cause families are so different and 
have such different conceptions of 
justice. We certainly have no theory 
of familial justice that is even r e  
motely adequate. But questions of 
family justice cannot be legitimately 
avoided. Attempts to do so marginal- 
ize people. If families emerge fiom 
their invisibility, we will all be able to 
see many cases in which benefits to 
patients are not suflicient to justify 
the burdens they impose on their 
families. Ask yourself, Would you 
rather lose your career and all your 
savings at age w-five, or lose a 50 
percent chance of living an extra 
year with a terminal disease at age 
eighty-three? Would anyone prefer 
the chance of an extra year? 
But a health care system sensitive 
to the burdens treatment decisions 
impose on families is nowhere in 
sight. In fact, those who focus on the 
doctor-patient dyad will not even 
agree that such a system would be 
morally legitimate. In the foreseeable 
future, then, families will continue to 
be invisible, marginalized, or reduced 
to means. Costs will, no doubt, con-, 
tinue to be shifted to families. W6 
will continue to be largely oblivioG 
to the impact of our health care sys- 
tem and our treatment decisions on 
their lives. 
In this context, the better the Earn; 
ily-the more loyal, sensitive, and 
loving the caregivers within the fam- 
i+the more we will take advantage 
of their resources and virtues. Un: 
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that reform (particularly in my own 
field-the law) has been to employ 
the model of consumer choice. That 
model sets as its purpose to allow 
consumers to choose the kinds of 
products they prefer. It seeks to ac- 
complish that purpose primarily by 
supplying consumers the informa- 
tion they need to make choices and 
by insisting that they are given what 
they chose. Thus, for example, mer- 
chants may be required to reveal the 
actual terms under which they sell 
able or unwilling to divorce herself 
ii-om her terrified and dying mother, 
Jane just keeps trying to hang in 
there. She and I have developed a 
little ritual. “How ya doing?” I ask 
when our paths cross. “I’m st i l l  ver- 
tical,” Jane responds. “That’s terrific, 
Jane, just terrific!” We smile sadly at 
the gallows humor. But the last time 
I saw her, she said, “If this goes on 
much longer, Mom is going to out- 
live m.” 
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goods on credit, so that customers 
may decide whether they wish to pay 
the price. And once the customer 
has chosen a purchase, the merchant 
is held to the terms originally agreed 
upon. In short, the consumer choice 
model seeks to allow customers to 
make successful choices by providing 
them with a market that works in the 
economist’s sense, efficiently. 
Bioethical reform may be under- 
stood along these lines. The doctrine 
of informed consent is, plainly, in- 
tended to provide patients the in- 
formation they need to make wise 
choices that express their prefer- 
ences. The patient is thus to become 
a consumer wellenough informed 
to make sensible choices in the mar- 
ket for medical care. The patient’s 
choices are then given more binding 
effect by, for example, various provi- 
sions for advance directives. 
The consumer choice model is 
hardly startling and surely makes a 
good deal of sense. The ii-eemarket 
prescription was, for instance, quite 
S25 
SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT 
Hastings Center Report. November-December 1995 
successful when it was employed dur- 
ing the New Deal to improve the OP 
eration of the securities market. But 
of course the consumer choice 
model rests on some consequential 
assumptions. It assumes, for one 
thing, that human preferences differ 
so much that it is best to let people 
make purchasing decisions for them- 
selves, It assumes a n  engaged and 
energetic purchaser. Finally, it as- 
sumes that people’s preferences are 
clear and strong enough to drive 
them to act on the information they 
receive to make choices and follow 
up on them. Thus the New Deal re- 
forms of the securities markets were 
plausible because many of the peo- 
ple who trade in that market know 
their way around it, have ready ac- 
cess to the information that is pro- 
vided, have commanding incentives 
to use it, and know how to do so. 
The SUPPORT study does not 
speak directly to all these assump 
tions. Nor could any single study d e  
hitively establish whether such as- 
sumptions are true. Nevertheless, this 
ambitious and impressive research 
raises some fruitful questions about 
the consumer choice model as it has 
been applied in medicine. The SUP- 
PORT enterprise followed that mod- 
el in trying to increase the commu- 
nication between doctor and patient 
so that both could make better deci- 
sions. But what is striking about the 
study is, despite a commitment of re- 
sources (and, one suspects, enthusi- 
asm) unlikely to be even matched, 
much less sustained, in the dullness 
of daily life, the SUPPORT instantia- 
tion of the model quite failed to pro- 
duce statistically significant benefits. 
What are we to make of this un- 
settling negative? To put the point 
simply, a strong reading of the study 
raises questions about the usefdness 
of continuing to emphasize the con- 
sumer choice model. In saying this, 
I am far from suggesting that ef- 
forts to implement the consumer 
choice model in bioethics have been 
wasted. I suspect that that model has 
helped spur changes in medical atti- 
tudes which were necessary to make 
doctors’ behavior more tolerable to 
contemporary American mores. My 
point, rather, is that-strongly 
read-the SUPPORT study provokes 
doubts about the profit of sustaining 
the consumer choice model at its 
present preeminence. 
But how strongly should we read 
the SUPPORT data? Our answer will 
depend on many things. But one 
reason to read it strongly is that SUP- 
PORT seems to confirm what we al- 
ready know about the effects of some 
other bioethical reforms in the con- 
sumer choice model-that those re- 
forms often seem to have fewer con- 
sequences than the consumer choice 
model seems to call for. Arthur 
Caplan, for instance, reports, “No 
more than 10 percent of the popu- 
lation has either a living will or a du- 
rable power of attorney.” He adds, 
“Similarly dismal statistics are re- 
ported for the practices surrounding 
the issuance of DNR (do-not-resusci- 
tate) , DNI (do-not-intubate) , and 
DNT (do-not-treat) orders in hospi- 
tals and nursing homes.”’ Likewise, 
studies of informed consent suggest 
the clumsiness with which doctors 
communicate with patients, the awk- 
wardness with which patients assimi- 
late what they are told, and the un- 
certain consequences of what pa- 
tients learn. Jay Katz thus concludes 
glumly that the law “has had little 
impact on patients’ decisionmaking 
either in legal theory or medical 
practice.’” Some substantiation of 
this conclusion lies, for example, in 
the fact that “the empirical and an- 
ecdotal studies of patients who refuse 
treatment almost never portray the 
process of obtaining informed con- 
sent as playing a causative role.” 
In short, the SUPPORT study is 
not alone in raising real questions 
about the extent to which the con- 
sumer choice model actually im- 
proves the lives of medical patients. 
Nor is it surprising that patients do 
not take full advantage of reform’s 
proffers of information and the 
means of effectuating their decisions. 
After all, consumers of all kinds 
seem to behave in this way. Consum- 
ers for years told pollsters that they 
wanted cars with seat belts, airbags, 
and other safety devices, that they 
wanted fuelefficient cars, and so on. 
Yet they did not seem to use their 
buying power to compel the market 
to provide them with those com- 
modities. 
Part of the reason for this kind of 
disappointment is that sellers do not 
always respond rationally to the mar- 
ket’s incentives. But other reasons lie 
in the consumer choice model’s as- 
sumptions I described earlier. Con- 
sumers’ preferences are often unde 
veloped, weak, and conflicting. Fur- 
thermore, as an economist would 
say, making and implementing deci- 
sions often imposes high transaction 
costs. And as a social psychologist 
might point out, reaching decisions 
is painful, and many people dislike 
and resist it. Thus it is to be ex- 
pected that studies of consumers 
often show that they do not seem to 
make effective use of the informa- 
tion the law has labored to supply to 
them. 
All this is no less true of making 
medical choices than buying cars. We 
tend to believe that because medi- 
cal decisions are so consequential in 
patients’ lives, patients must have 
strong opinions about them that 
they wish to put into action. In fact, 
however, there is considerable em- 
pirical evidence that some substantial 
proportion of patients do not yearn 
to make their own medical deci- 
s ion~.~ No doubt part of the reason 
for this is the one the authors of the 
SUPPORT study propose-that pa- 
tients, strangers in a strange land, 
are trying to accommodate them- 
selves to local custom. But I t h i i  
that the reasons run a good deal 
deeper than this, into people’s sense 
of their own competence, into the 
vigor with which sick people can ex- 
ert themselves, even into questions 
about where people’s sharpest con- 
cerns and most active interests lie? 
In short, the SUPPORT study and 
other studies like it raise the possibil- 
ity that in the medical context the 
consumer choice model may at some 
point confi-ont strong resistance not 
just from the structure of medicine 
and the imperialism of doctors, but 
in the hearts and minds of patients. 
One legitimate response to such a 
suggestion is to say that we must 
fight it out along these lines however 
long it takes, because the principle 
of patient autonomy is too cherished 
to compromise. But if my specula- 
tions about the SUPPORT study are 
correct, such a battle is hardly an ap- 
petizing prospect. 
What, then, is to be done? Our 
analogy to consumer protection sug- 
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gests one kind of answer. The con- 
sumer choice model has long been 
supplemented with what we may 
loosely call the consumer welfare 
model. When the market failed to 
deliver fuel-efficient cars equipped 
with airbags quickly enough, we cre 
ated regulatory incentives for them. 
Similarly, it may now be time for 
bioethics to accelerate a shift that 
seems already to have begun-away 
from patient choice and toward 
changing the medical care system so 
that it delivers a better product To 
put the point provocatively, it may be 
time to think about giving patients 
what we think they want, but have 
not been able to secure for them- 
selves. We might even consider try- 
ing to give patients what we think 
they would want if they thought 
about i t  
Or, to make the suggestion less 
wickedly, perhaps we should redirect 
our attention away from the proce- 
dures by which medical decisions are 
made and toward the substance of 
those decisions. Bioethics has histori- 
cally looked to the former, in part 
(albeit only in part) because it was 
supposed to lead to the latter. Com- 
mon sense has been supposed to 
suggest that if patients were supplied 
with good information, they would 
make wise, or at least satisfying, d e  
cisions. But the SUPPORT study 
helps to suggest doubts about 
whether the procedural approach 
improves decisions or even patients’ 
satisfaction with decisions. If these 
doubts are well-founded, one re- 
sponse is to look directly at those d e  
cisions and to try to improve them. 
But truth, what is that? said jesting 
Pilate. How may we know a good 
choice when we see it? Are not pee  
ple’s preferences so varied that we 
cannot usefully prescribe for them? 
There is obviously much to be said 
for this objection. But there are also 
several things to be said against i t  
Let me suggest three. 
First, I am not proposing that we 
coerce or deceive patients into what 
we thii is good for them. Rather, I 
suggest that we try to develop some 
degree of social consensus-where it 
is possible to do so-on questions of 
bioethical relevance and difficulty. In 
other words, we may find it helpful 
to furnish patients with well-thought- 
out answers to standard kinds of 
bioethical problems. Patients would, 
crucially, be able to reject those an- 
swers, but the answers would be 
there for patients to consult, and 
they would be the default solution 
and their doctors, and as they see 
new problems with new eyes. Fur- 
ther, the preferences they develop 
(whether before or after they b e  
come ill) will arise from and be 
shaped by prevailing cultural atti- 
It may now be time for bioethics to accelerate a shift 
that seems already to have begun-away from patient 
choice and toward changing the medical care system 
so that it delivers a better product. 
where patients would not or could 
not act 
Of course, there are effectively de- 
fault positions now, as the SUPPORT 
study implies. But these positions t e  
day may insufliciently represent the 
views and interests of patients and 
overrepresent those of doctors. Where 
the consumer choice model cannot 
solve those problems of r ep re  
sentation, the consumer welfare 
model may at least be able to create 
a kind of countervailing force. 
The second response to the view 
that patients’ preferences vary too 
much to make consensus possible is 
that it is probably not true about 
every issue. The SUPPORT study, for 
instance, notes that a troubling num- 
ber of dying patients suffer a disqui- 
eting amount of pain. And it is now 
widely observed that physicians have 
not always taken the fullest advan- 
tage of progress in pain manage- 
ment It might be more profitable to 
look directly to ways of getting doc- 
tors to treat pain more aggressively 
than to try to do so indirectly by in- 
creasing patient choice. 
Third, it is important to realize 
that quite often people do not have 
preferences about their medical care 
before they become ill, and that 
what preferences they may have are 
sometimes inchoate, ill formed, and 
insubstantial. Instead of existing be- 
fore illness, patients’ preferences 
often develop as patients come to see 
what it is like to be sick, as they in- 
teract with their family, their friends, 
tudes. The kind of effort I am p re  
posing for bioethics may help shape 
the cultural attitudes that shape pa- 
tient attitudes, so that the default p+ 
sition that develops out of it will 
seem agreeable to many patients. 
Indeed, we are already seeing pro- 
gress toward establishing the kind of 
default position the consumer wel- 
fare model calls for in just one of 
the areas the SUPPORT study treats- 
end-of-life decisions. Through proc- 
esses like the social discussion of 
cases from Binlan and CzzLzan we 
seem to be moving toward a cultural 
consensus that patients in persistent 
vegetative states should not be kept 
alive when hope is gone. And under 
the mantra “quality more than quan- 
tity,” we-the public, patients, and 
doctoeare  in my observation mov- 
ing, even if less swiftly, toward a 
greater reluctance to treat dying pa- 
tients in the excessive way the SUP- 
PORT study implicitly criticizes. 
The SUPPORT study suggests yet 
another reason it may be more prof- 
itable to look directly at what medi- 
cine does rather than at how to in- 
crease patients’ autonomy. SUP- 
PORT was conducted in notably bu- 
reaucratic settings. That is where a 
telling number of critical medical de- 
cisions are now made. And that is 
where they will increasingly be made. 
Our experience with bureaucracies 
suggests that giving clients an authori- 
tative voice in them can be implaca- 
bly difliculc so often the cure for the 
ills of bureaucracy is more bureauc- 
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racy. For example, clients’ decisional 
claims are commonly protected 
through due process sorts of solu- 
tions. But the research on due proc- 
ess protections finds that they regu- 
larly disappoint. Bureaucrats often 
see due process devices as irrational 
impositions, and respond to them 
formalistically. Clients overwhelm- 
ingly fail to use such due process fa- 
vorites as the right to a hearing! 
What is more, due process remedies 
lengthen the process of decision 
without necessarily yielding happier 
results. This suggests to me that it 
will often be better to deliver the 
“right” service in the first place. 
It is surely desirable to structure 
medical care in such a way that pa- 
tients are as involved in it as they 
want to be. That is what the con- 
sumer choice model does and is 
right to do. But we need to ask 
where to put reformist energy, and 
that model may, for the time at least, 
have done much of what it can for 
us. It may thus be time to strengthen 
efforts toward a consumer welfare 
model. Building default positions 
that are more satisfactory than some 
of the ones we now have, and that 
acknowledge that not everything can 
be accomplished by giving patients 
autonomy, is one way to start. But 
the SUPPORT study suggests one 
more cautionary note. It is harder to 
change human behavior and social 
institutions than we like to think. 
And in this regard, enterprises of 
great pitch and moment their cur- 
rents turn awry and lose the name 
of action. 
References 
1. Arthur L. Caplan, “Can Autonomy 
Be Saved?” in IfI Wme a Rich Man Could I 
The Enormity of the Task 
SUPPORT and Changing Practice 
by Mildred 2. Solomon 
o interpret the SUPPORT 
study, it is important to 
place it in the context of 
design of interventions 
aimed at changing behavior. This 
specialized field draws on theories 
and empirical research from several 
spheres, including studies in social 
psychology, adult learning, profes 
sional education, knowledge and re- 
search utilization, communications 
MildredZSdomonisaseniurscien&at 
theEdurntion Devebpment Ceng Newton, 
Mass. 
Mildred Z. Solomon, “The Enormity of the Task 
The SUPPORT Study and Chaneine: Practice.” 
Special~upplement, H h . 9  &&+mi 25, no. 
6 (1995): S28s32. 
research, social marketing, and the 
adoption and diffusion of innova- 
tions. Models of behavior change 
have been developed that provide a 
theoretical foundation for shaping 
health promotion and disease pre- 
vention strategies. For the most part, 
these theories have been applied to 
the design of health promotion cam- 
paigns that aim to encourage indi- 
viduals to adopt healthy behaviors or 
refbin from ones that put them at 
increased risk of illness or injury. 
Recently there has been growing 
interest in learning how to encour- 
age physicians to adopt new behav- 
iors. This interest arises in part from 
a desire to ensure that medical prac- 
tice reflects stateaf-the-art scientific 
knowledge, in part from a desire to 
Buy a Pancreas?And OthEssays on theEth- 
ics @Health Care (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992), pp. 256,261. 
2. Jay Katz, “Informed Consent AFairy 
Tale,” university @RttsbuTh Law Reuieu 39 
(1977): 137,139. 
3. Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz, 
and Alan Meisel, I n f m d  Gmsent: Legal 
Themy and ClinicalPractice (New York Ox- 
ford University Press, 1987), p. 202. 
4. For a survey of these data, see Carl 
E. Schneider, “Bioethics with a Human 
Face,” Indiana Law Journal 69 (1994): 
1075. 
5. I explore this dBicult topic at great 
length in Carl E. Schneider, “Patients, 
Doctors, and Decisions: Re-Examining 
Autonomy” (in manuscript). 
6. See, for example, Carl E. Schneider, 
“Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Le- 
gitimacy in Family Policy,” Michigan Law 
Reuieu84 (1986): 919. 
curtail unnecessary, often expensive 
procedures and tests, and in part 
fi-om the recognition that traditional 
continuing medical education has 
had very little impact on physicians’ 
clinical practice.’ 
Whether directed to physicians or 
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In short, sound behavior change in- 
terventions are theory driven, ex- 
plicit about value assumptions, and 
empirically based. 
Although the SUPPORT study does 
not address the theory of change 
that guided the design of its inter- 
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